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Articles
The Maurice Clarett Story:
A Justice System Failure
Alan C. Milstein*

The Maurice Clarett (“Clarett”) story is emblematic of what is
wrong with the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s
(“NCAA”) arbitrary and unjust enforcement process.
It
demonstrates how a life that held such promise was laid to waste
by the NCAA’s unholy alliance with the National Football League
(“NFL”)—a league that keeps young men toiling at grave risk and
for no pay in a plantation system known as college football. It is
also a personal story about a case that should have been won, but
whose loss keeps getting me invited to symposiums like this. To
quote Bob Dylan: “[T]here is no success like failure, and that
failure is no success at all.”1
Maurice Clarett was born in Youngstown, Ohio, where he
attended Warren G. Harding High School. Raised by his single
* Shareholder and Chairman of the Litigation Department at Sherman,
Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, P.A. The author represented Maurice
Clarett in Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004). The author received
his J.D., with honors, from Temple University School of Law; his M.A. from
the University of Kansas; and his B.A. from the University of Maryland.
This Article is derived from the author’s speech at Roger Williams University
School of Law on March 21, 2014 and from the briefs filed in Clarett, which
were prepared with the assistance of Daniel Allanoff, Michael McCann, and
Robert McCormack.
1. BOB DYLAN, Love Minus Zero/No Limit, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK
HOME (Columbia Records 1965).
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mother, Clarett and his older brother faced tough times in a tough
neighborhood. When his older brother ended up with a lengthy
prison term, Clarett was determined to live a different life. His
way out was based on his ability to do one thing remarkably well:
carry an odd shaped ball at blazing speed around, and sometimes
through, others trying to stop him.
While in high school, Clarett became a nationally known
football player, receiving many accolades, including being named
the USA Today Offensive Player of the Year as a senior and
chosen as “Mr. Football” by the Associated Press.2 Clarett
graduated high school on December 11, 2001, two-thirds of the
way through the 2001 NFL season. Subsequently, he enrolled in
classes at Ohio State University in January 2002 in order to
attend spring football practice.3
He seemed destined for
greatness.4
On August 24, 2002, Clarett became the first true-freshman
tailback to start a football game for the Buckeyes since 1943.5
Ohio State beat Texas Tech that day by a score of forty-five to
twenty-one, and Clarett rushed for 175 yards and scored three
touchdowns.6 Texas Tech’s free safety Ryan Aycock commented
on a particular play: “He might have been 18 but he knew what
he was doing . . . That’s when you knew he’d be great. Not many
guys his age have the heart to keep fighting once they’re
stopped.”7
With Clarett leading the way, Ohio State achieved rousing
success during the 2002-2003 college football season. Clarett
rushed for an Ohio State freshman record of 1,237 yards and
scored eighteen touchdowns, despite missing two games with

2. See Craig Smith, Ohio State back makes big splash, SEATTLE TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2002), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=
20020912&slug=coug12.
3. See Billy Witz, Battle for the Ages Ensues in NFL, DAILY NEWS (Dec.
14, 2003), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-9034215.html.
4. See Michael A. McCann, Justice Sotomayor and the Relationship
between Leagues and Players: Insights and Implications, 42 CONN. L. REV.
901, 910–12 (2010).
5. See Road to the Title, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 2003, at S2,
available at 2003 WLNR 524692.
6. See id.
7. Luke Cyphers, Call Waiting, ESPN INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2003, 11:35
PM), http://insider.espn.go.com/insider/story?id=1619403.
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injuries.8
Ohio State went undefeated during the regular
season—winning thirteen straight games—and awaited a date in
Arizona with the vaunted Miami Hurricanes to compete for the
national title.9
Just prior to the Fiesta Bowl, however, Clarett’s roots
resurfaced when a close friend died in a gang related shooting.10
Clarett told Coach Jim Tressel (“Tressel”) that he needed to attend
the funeral.
The school’s Athletic Director, Andy Geiger
(“Geiger”), assured Clarett and his mother that the University
would fly him back to Youngstown after a week of practice in
Arizona.11 However, when it came time for the sad trip home, the
Buckeyes reneged, telling Clarett that he had failed to complete
the proper paperwork.12 Clarett publicly expressed his outrage at
a news conference, essentially labeling Geiger a liar and uttering
words that, to the Buckeye faithful, was surely sacrilege: “I guess
football is more important than a person’s life to them.”13
Ohio State defeated the University of Miami in the Fiesta
Bowl and won the national championship, its first title in thirtyfour years.14 Though not named the game’s MVP, Clarett scored
the winning touchdown and made a game saving defensive play,
forcing a fumble following an interception that almost sealed the
win for the Hurricanes.15
Back at school for the spring semester, Clarett enrolled in
Paulette Pierce’s African American History course. Professor
Pierce had heard the stories of Buckeye football players being
8. See Liz Clarke, Buckeyes put Clarett on Hold; Running Back Won’t be
Allowed to Practice, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2003), available at http://
www.highbeam.com/ doc/1P2-280646.html.
9. See id.
10. See Associated Press, Clarett angered at decision forcing him to miss
funeral, CBS SPORTS (Dec. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Clarett Funeral Cover],
available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/814334/posts?page=62.
11. See id.
12. See William C. Rhoden, Paying the Price While Coaches Cash In,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/sports/ncaa
football/09rhoden.html.
13. Clarett Funeral Cover, supra note 10; see also McCann, supra note 4,
at 910.
14. See National Champions, MICHIGAN VS. OHIO STATE, http://library.
osu.edu/projects/OSUvsMichigan/national_titles.html (last visited Dec. 29,
2014).
15. See Bruce Hooley, Dot the “i” in Title, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan.
4, 2003, at D1, available at 2003 WLNR 523982.
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given tutors who would write papers for the players and feed them
answers to exams, and she would have none of it. She told the
freshman she wanted him in her office early every Monday
morning to discuss his assignments and would proceed to give him
an oral final exam. According to Clarett, she was the only
professor at Ohio State who cared about his academics, not his
touchdowns.
No one quite knows the exact source, but someone at Ohio
State contacted the New York Times that summer and told a tale
of how Maurice Clarett received special treatment in Professor
Pierce’s class.16 On July 12, 2003, Mike Freeman, a sportswriter
for the Times who later resigned because of discrepancies in his
curriculum vitale, published a multi-column article that exposed,
in his perception, outrageous academic corruption.17 Always
vigilant, the NCAA’s enforcement arm sprung into action.
In August, Clarett was summoned to Geiger’s office where,
without notice, counsel, or even a parent, he was questioned for
more than an hour by an NCAA enforcement officer. The subject
of favorable treatment in the classroom was soon dismissed. What
really interested the NCAA was how Clarett, a poor kid from
Youngstown, could drive around in a new SUV. Clarett had
received the vehicle on loan from a local car dealer who was
friendly with Tressel, a fact Clarett would not reveal out of loyalty
to his coach. When the NCAA demanded a second interview, a
friend of Clarett called and asked if I could help. I showed up at
Geiger’s office with Clarett’s mother and Hall of Famer Jim
Brown, a hero in Ohio and Clarett’s mentor. For most of the
session, the three of us were locked out of the “proceedings” as
Clarett was again drilled for more than an hour. When they
finally let us in, we were not allowed to participate, resulting in
Brown uttering the quintessential legal argument: “This is
bullshit!”
16. See Mike Freeman, When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid
in Ohio State Class, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/
2003/07/13/sports/colleges-when-values-collide-clarett-got-unusual-aid-in-ohio
-state-class.html.
17. See id.
Freeman resigned from the New York Times after
acknowledging that he did not graduate from the University of Delaware, as
he had previously claimed. See Howard Kurtz, Puffed-up Resume Costs
Sportswriter a New Job, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2004), available at http://www.
highbeam.com/doc/1P2-148948.html.
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An often-misunderstood quirk in NCAA enforcement actions
is that the NCAA has no jurisdiction over and cannot sanction
players.18 Its authority is limited to the schools within the
NCAA.19 However, if the school fails to sanction the offending
player, the NCAA will sanction the school.20 The result is a
system that leaves the player with limited appeal rights since the
investigative body takes no action. For Clarett, this meant that
Geiger, the man he had called a liar, was judge and jury with the
added incentive to throw Clarett under the bus to save his multimillion dollar football operation. On September 9, 2003, Geiger
announced at a press conference that Clarett was suspended for at
least the upcoming season, and perhaps indefinitely, for not being
candid with the NCAA and receiving property worth over
$20,000.00.21 No report by the NCAA was ever presented to
Clarett. There were no findings of fact, and there was no forum to
which he could lodge an appeal. No sanctions were leveled
against the University.
With no ability to play collegiate football, Clarett had little
choice but to attempt to gain early access into the NFL. Through
channels, we had heard that if Clarett entered the draft, the
Dallas Cowboys would take him in the first round. The problem
was that NFL teams had conspired to agree that no player in
Clarett’s college class would be eligible for the draft. Interestingly
enough, Michigan State law professor Robert McCormack had just
recently published an Op-Ed piece in the New York Times
declaring the NFL’s age eligibility rule to be in violation of
antitrust laws.22 With my close friend Dan Allanoff, an antitrust
expert, we drafted the Complaint using Professor McCormack’s
article as a guide. I wrote the NFL and asked if they wanted to
discuss the matter before we filed suit.
18. See generally Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning
Blame Where it Belongs, 52 B.C.L. REV. 551 (2011).
19. See generally id.
20. See generally id.
21. See Stephen A. Smith, Hypocrisy rules in Columbus: Ohio State
destroys the promising future of its star running back, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept.
14, 2003), available at 2003 WLNR 14784315.
22. See Robert A. McCormick, Open Letter to Maurice Clarett: Why You
May Turn Professional Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2003), http://www.
nytimes.com/2003/08/17/sports/backtalk-open-letter-to-maurice-clarett-whyyou-may-turn-professional-now.html.
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On Monday, September 22, 2003, Clarett’s mother and I met
with the NFL’s counsel to discuss Clarett’s participation in the
April 2004 player draft, which I argued would be held after three
NFL seasons had “elapsed” since Clarett’s high school
graduation.23 The NFL representatives responded that the rule
required three years to pass after the player’s class, as opposed to
the player, graduated from high school. While the precise
language of the rule was not a matter of public record, the league
denied Clarett’s request to enter the draft in order to preserve its
rule. We filed suit in federal district court in Manhattan the next
day. Two days later, Mike Freeman of the Times wrote a profile of
me, titled Clarett’s Lawyer Sees Abuse of Power by Pro Football.24
He neglected to recognize that I informed him that he had been
used by Ohio State to malign Clarett in his prior academic piece.
The case was assigned to Judge Shira Scheindlin, a Bill
Clinton nominee.
While we had not asked for immediate
injunctive relief, and the Complaint had still not been formally
served, I received a call from the Judge’s clerk within three days
of filing, summoning counsel to New York for a pretrial
conference. The Judge advised that the case was ripe for
summary judgment and issued an expedited schedule with our
briefs due at the end of October. When the briefing was
completed, and as we waited for a decision, Mike Freeman
surfaced yet again, this time with a profile of Judge Scheindlin,
titled Judge in Clarett Case will Get an NFL Education.25 He
quoted the Judge as saying: ‘‘I don’t think I have ever watched a
football game . . . maybe one half of one Super Bowl. Does that
count?’’26 Needless to say, the case was taking on a life of its own.
Standing in the way of a successful challenge to the rule was
a legal concept known as the “non-statutory labor exemption.”
Under Mackey v. National Football League, later endorsed in
23. The first season, which had begun when Clarett started his senior
year, ended on February 4, 2002, fifty-five days after Clarett’s graduation;
the other two seasons were played out in full.
24.
Mike Freeman, The Case for Clarett, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/25/sports/football/25milstein.html.
25. Mike Freeman, Judge in Clarett Case Will Get N.F.L. Education,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/11/sports/
football-judge-in-clarett-case-will-get-nfl-education.html.
26. Id. (quoting Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist.
of N.Y.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.,27 this exemption for unlawful
restraints would shelter an anticompetitive labor-management
agreement only if each of the following elements were met: (1) the
agreement is the product of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining; (2)
the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining; and (3) the restraint on trade affects only the parties
to the collective bargaining relationship.28
Clarett would prevail if the rule failed to satisfy any one
prong but, as the facts would demonstrate, the rule failed all
three: it was not bargained for; did not concern wages, hours, or
terms and conditions of employment; and primarily affected those
outside the bargaining unit, like Clarett.
The NFL enjoys a monopoly over professional football. The
league began operating in 1920 as the American Professional
Football Association, an unincorporated association comprised of
member clubs, which owned and operated professional football
teams.29 Presently, the NFL is comprised of thirty-two separately
incorporated clubs in cities throughout the United States.30
Representatives from each of the clubs form the NFL
Management Committee, which performs various administrative
functions such as organizing and scheduling games and
promulgating rules.31 The clubs appoint a commissioner who is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the NFL.32
At issue in this case was the NFL’s concerted refusal to allow
a player to sign with an NFL team or be eligible for the draft
unless three NFL seasons had elapsed since that player’s high
school graduation.33 The rule appeared in the Constitution and
Bylaws of the NFL, a document drafted and approved only by the
NFL member teams.34 Section 12.1(E) of the Bylaws provided,
“for college football players seeking special eligibility, at least
three NFL seasons must have elapsed since the player was

27. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
28. 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
29. See Michael A. McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to
Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L. J. 726, 730 (2010).
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
34. See id. at 127–28.
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graduated from high school.”35
The rule had been in existence for fifty years, although it
originally required the player to either complete four years of
college, or have five NFL seasons elapse since his high school
graduation.36 The NFL announced a different version of the rule
to the public in a press release dated February 16, 1990.37 The
NFL also issued a memorandum to Club Presidents, General
Managers, and Head Coaches, which stated that “[a]pplications
for special eligibility for the 1990 draft will be accepted only from
college players as to whom three full college seasons have elapsed
since their high school graduations.”38 The rule as stated in the
Bylaws, however, referenced “NFL seasons,” not “college seasons”
and did not include the word “full.”39 In 1997, Greg Aiello,
director of communications for the NFL, expressed yet another
version of the rule: “The rule is this: to be eligible for the NFL, a
player has to have been out of high school for three years.”40
In addition, the NFL had not enforced the rule in a consistent
manner. In 1964, for example, Andy Livingston, a nineteen-yearold running back, signed a contract with the Chicago Bears after
only one season of junior college football.41 In 1988, when there
was a four-year requirement, the NFL allowed Craig “Ironhead”
Heyward into the draft even though he had not yet graduated

35. See Tom Farrey, Clarett to use NFL rule against league, ESPN (Dec.
13, 2003, 12:12 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=1684775
(quoting NFL BYLAW § 12.1(E)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The NFL
provided a copy of this document in response to Clarett’s initial Request to
Produce, see Memorandum from NFL, available at http://www.sskrplaw.
com/files/clarettreply.pdf (emphasis added).
36. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126.
37. See id. at 126, 128.
38. Id. at 128 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Another memorandum dated October 1992 and issued to Club
Owners, Presidents, and General Managers indicates that the Rule was
revised to reflect the change from the four-year requirement to the current
requirement of “three NFL seasons” in October 1992. See id. at 127 n.7.
40. Plaintiff Maurice Clarett’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His
Motion for Summary Judgment at 6, Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (No.
03 Civ. 7441(SAS)), 2003 WL 26053422 [hereinafter Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J.]
(citing Tim May, Two Years and Out?, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 4, 1997).
41. See William C. Rhoden, In 1964, a Teenager Showed He Could Play,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/14/sports/sportsof-the-times-in-1964-a-teenager-showed-he-could-play.html.
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from college.42 In 1989, again when there was a four-year
requirement, the NFL allowed Barry Sanders into the draft after
he suggested he would challenge the rule, although he was a truejunior with only three NFL seasons having elapsed since his high
school graduation.43 In 1991, the Arizona Cardinals selected Eric
Swann as the sixth pick of the first round of the draft.44 Swann
had never played college football and, at the time, only two NFL
seasons had elapsed since his high school graduation.45
Although the rule had been in effect since at least 1953, it was
not until 1968 that the NFL recognized the National Football
League Players Association (“NFLPA”) as the players’ collective
bargaining representative.46 1968 was also the year of the first
Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between the
NFL and its players.47 Nowhere in that first agreement did the
rule appear. The CBA came into effect in 2003, which had been
extended three times, was negotiated in 1993, and did not expire
until the 2007 season.48 This agreement was comprised of 292
pages, sixty-one articles, appendices A through N, and 357
sections; but, like its predecessors, it did not contain the rule.49
Moreover, in Article III, Section I, titled “Scope of Agreement,” the
42. See New Pittsburgh Courier Editorial Staff, Steelers take Ironhead’s
son in first round, NEW PITTSBURGH COURIER (May 4, 2011), http://
newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2011/05/04/steelers-take-ironheads-son-infirst-round/.
43. See Time Wire Services, Barry Sanders Admitted to NFL Draft, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-04/sports/sp1132_1_barry-sanders.
44. See Jess Root, Arizona Cardinals Top 10 Draft Successes: No. 3,
Anquan Boldin, SB NATION: REVENGE OF THE BIRDS (Apr. 21, 2011, 10:47
AM), http://www.revengeofthebirds.com/2011/4/21/2125117/arizona-cardinalstop-10-draft-successes-no-7-eric-swann.
45. See Jeff Legwold, College Not Required to Make Grade in the NFL,
ROCKY
MOUNTAIN
NEWS
(Sept.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-122568371.html.
Other NFL players
never played football in college, including Michael Lewis, Antonio Gates,
Clinton Hart, Gene “Big Daddy” Lipscomb, Otis Sistrunk, and Cookie
Gilchrist. See id.
46. See Jarrett Bell, Timeline of NFL Labor Disputes, USA Today (Mar.
12, 2011, 12:36 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/201103-03-nfl-labor-disputes-timeline_N.htm.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See generally Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age
Restrictions in the NBA and NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731 (2006).
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CBA contained an integration clause, stating: “This Agreement
represents the complete understanding of the parties on all
subjects covered herein, and there will be no change in the terms
and conditions of this Agreement without mutual consent.”50
Plainly then, the CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA did not
contain, and has never contained, the rule.51
The “NFL suggested at the scheduling conference that the
NFLPA had nevertheless expressly agreed to the Rule by virtue of
‘a side letter.’”52 When asked “to produce this document in
discovery, the NFL delivered a letter dated May 6, 1993, written
by its counsel and addressed to counsel for the NFLPA.”53 That
letter, which attached the Bylaws containing the rule, states that
“the attached documents are the presently existing provisions of
the Constitution and Bylaws of the NFL referenced in Article IV,
Section 2, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.”54
The
referenced CBA Article was entitled “No Suit” and provides simply
that “neither [the NFLPA] nor any of its members will sue [the
NFL] . . . relating to the presently existing provisions of the . . .
Bylaws.”55 There was no reference to the rule in either the letter
or the Article.
Thus, rather than demonstrating that the rule was somehow
expressly bargained over, the so-called “side letter” merely
provided a copy of the Bylaws as to which the NFLPA had agreed
that neither it nor any of its members would bring suit.
Obviously, Clarett was not a member of the NFLPA, nor was he
represented by that labor organization.
At the time, the NFL was the only major sports organization
that prohibited players from entering its draft until a prescribed
period after high school graduation. The National Basketball
50. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing NFL
Collective Bargaining Agreement art. III, § 1 [hereinafter NFL CBA]).
51.
Probably as a result of the Clarett litigation, the current CBA
contains the rule. See NFL CBA art. VI (Aug. 4, 2011), available at
http://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement2011-2020.pdf.
52. Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 40, at 7.
53. Id.
54. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 128 (quoting Letter from NFL, to NFLPA (May
6, 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting NFL CBA art. IV, § 2)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Association, Major League Baseball, and the National Hockey
League had no such restrictions.56 By virtue of the rule, the NFL
member teams agreed with one another not to hire players until
three NFL seasons had elapsed since the players graduated from
high school. Because of the NFL teams’ concerted refusal to deal
with this segment of the talent pool, these players were absolutely
and unreasonably restricted from competing for positions in the
league and were unlawfully delayed or prevented from earning a
livelihood in their chosen profession.
By forcing prospective players to wait until three NFL
seasons had elapsed before becoming eligible for its draft, the NFL
was able to maintain a free and efficient “farm” system for
developing players. College football acts, in effect, as a minor
league, for which the NFL incurs no expenses. While Major
League Baseball teams each spend an average of nine million
dollars annually for the minor league system, the NFL teams
spend virtually nothing on a player development system.57
Instead, the only such costs incurred by NFL teams are for their
scouts, to whom the NCAA grants easy and ready access. Under
the current system, NFL teams take no financial risks of investing
in players while they are in college. Indeed, if a player suffers an
injury while in the NCAA, or does not develop as expected, which
reduces his value or renders him unable to play professionally, the
NFL teams lose nothing. The NCAA is a willing partner in this
cozy arrangement as college football generates millions of dollars
for the schools without their having to incur the expense of player
salaries. Players who are otherwise able to compete with the best
in their profession must bide their time on the farm working for
nothing.
For extremely talented players, like Maurice Clarett, who
were otherwise able to compete for a position at the professional
level, there were no comparable options. Not only were members
of this segment of the talent pool arbitrarily foreclosed from
playing their trade for three seasons, they were also prevented
during that time from enjoying the opportunity to reap other
financial rewards attendant upon becoming a professional athlete,

56.
57.

See McCann, supra note 4, at 911.
See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 197 (1999).
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such as endorsements, appearance income, and other business
opportunities. As one respected sports economist estimated,
valuing the cost of tuition and board and dividing it by the
estimated number of hours dedicated to the sport, the median
hourly wage for a college football athlete is just $7.69.58
Moreover, if these players suffer career-ending injury while
playing at the college level, their opportunity for financial rewards
in football would be forever lost.
Clarett’s predicament was even more dire than that of the
typical college player. He was suspended from playing college
football for his entire sophomore season and perhaps beyond
because of alleged NCAA violations. Moreover, Clarett had no
guarantee that the suspension would not carry into his junior
season. Thus, Clarett could not play either as an amateur in the
NCAA or as a professional in the NFL. He was a football player
without a game.
Clarett, who was six-feet tall and weighed 230 pounds, would
have been about eight weeks shy of his twenty-first birthday at
the start of the 2004 NFL season. When the 2000 NFL season
began, five players were twenty-one years old.59 During the 2001
NFL season, seven NFL players were twenty-one years old.60 At
the start of the 2002 NFL season, eight NFL players were twentyyears old.61 Clinton Portis, the great running back with the
Denver Broncos, turned twenty-one at the start of the 2002 NFL
season.62
The supposed purpose of the rule was to protect players who
58. See Patrick K. Thornton, Sports Law 162 (2011).
59. Players who were 21 during the 2000 NFL season include Jacoby
Shephard (birthday August 31, 1979), Jamal Lewis (birthday August 26,
1979), Dez White (birthday August 23, 1979), Kwame Cavil (birthday May 3,
1979), and Deon Grant (birthday March 14, 1979). See generally NFL.com
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
60. Specifically, Hakim Akbar, Kendrell Bell, Michael Vick, Koren
Robinson, Todd Heap, Dennis Norman, and Brandon Manumaleuna. See
generally NFL.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31,
2014).
61. Toniu Fonoti, Trev Faulk, Albert Haynesworth, Saleem Rasheed,
Lito Sheppard, Antonio Bryant, T.J. Duckett, and Josh Robinson. See
generally NFL.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2014); SI.com (last visited Dec. 31,
2014).
62. See Clinton Portis Profile, NFL, www.nfl.com/players/playerpage/
302215 (last visited Dec. 29, 2014).
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were not physically ready to compete against the men in the
NFL.63 Clarett was as tall, or taller, and weighed as much, or
more, than NFL running back legends Walter Payton, Barry
Sanders, and Gale Sayers when they played football.64 Of the top
twenty rushing leaders after the fifth week of the 2003 NFL
season, Clarett weighed as much as or more than seventeen of
them and was as tall or taller than fifteen of them.65 “In addition,
Emmitt Smith, who has rushed for more yards than any player in
the history of the NFL, was 20 years old when drafted in 1990,
and weighed less and was shorter than Clarett.”66 If the purpose
of the rule was to protect players not physically mature enough to
play in the pros, it had no logical application or connection to
Clarett. In addition, a rule designed to safeguard against
physically immature players could have been accomplished by far
better means—such as, most obviously, a rule requiring certain
height, weight, and strength to play in the NFL.
On February 5, 2004, Judge Scheindlin issued her opinion
finding in favor of Clarett.67 The Judge began by stating that
“Clarett’s challenge to the Rule raises serious questions arising at
the intersection of labor law and antitrust law, not to mention the
intersection of college football and professional football.”68 In
rejecting the NFL’s argument that the rule was immune from
antitrust scrutiny because of the non-statutory labor exemption,
the district court found that the rule did not concern a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act
63. See Adam Millsap, High school football players should be allowed to
go pro, TIGER (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.thetigernews.com/news.php?
aid=8203&sid=2.
64. See Clarett’s Mot. Summ. J., supra note 40, at 10.
65. See id. at 10 n.23 (“The top 20 rushing leaders after the 5th week of
the 2003 NFL season, with their height and weight are: (1) Jamal Lewis,
5’11”, 240 lbs.; (2) Stephen Davis, 6’0”, 230 lbs.; (3) Ahman Green, 6’0”, 217
lbs.; (4) Priest Holmes, 5’9”, 213 lbs.; (5) LaDainian Tomlinson, 5’10”, 221
lbs.; (6) Clinton Portis, 5’11”, 205 lbs.; (7) Deuce McAllister, 6’1”, 221 lbs.; (8)
Fred Taylor, 6’1”, 234; (9) Moe Williams, 6’1”, 205 lbs.; (10) Ricky Williams,
5’10”, 226 lbs.; (11) Tiki Barber, 5’10”, 200 lbs.; (12) William Green, 6’0”, 215
lbs.; (13) Shaun Alexander, 5’11”, 225 lbs.; (14) Anthony Thomas, 6’2”, 228
lbs.; (15) Troy Hambrick, 6’1”, 233 lbs.; (16) Garrison Hearst, 5’11”, 215 lbs.;
(17) Trung Canidate, 5’11”, 215 lbs.; (18) Edgerrin James, 6’0”, 214 lbs.; (19)
Amos Zereoue, 5’8”, 212 lbs.; (20) Michael Pittman, 6’0”, 218 lbs.”).
66. Id.
67. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
68. Id. at 382.
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(“NLRA”), restrained only non-employees, and “did not clearly
result from arm’s length negotiations.”69 Without the shield of the
labor exemption to protect the rule, the court found the rule to be
“blatantly anticompetitive”70 and determined that “Clarett ha[d]
alleged the very type of injury—a complete bar to entry into the
market for his services—that the antitrust laws are designed to
prevent.”71 Quoting Learned Hand, the court observed “that the
antitrust laws will not tolerate a contract ‘which unreasonably
forbids any one to practice his calling.’”72
In deciding whether to invoke the exemption, the district
court used the three-pronged standard set forth by the Eighth
Circuit in Mackey.73 Because labor law mandates collective
bargaining only over “wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment,” the district court reasoned, “only
agreements on these subjects (and intimately related subjects) are
exempt from the antitrust laws.”74 Inasmuch as mandatory
subjects of bargaining apply only to employees, the court reasoned
that the exemption may only be used to shield agreements that
affect employees who will be bound by those actions.75 Clarett
and similarly situated athletes were not employees within the
meaning of the NLRA, nor did the NFLPA represent them in any
capacity, including collective bargaining, nor were they even
eligible for employment or inclusion in the collective bargaining
unit.
In addressing whether the rule falls within the meaning of
“wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”
under the NLRA, the district court observed that the rule makes
no reference to wages, hours, or conditions of employment of
employees or persons eligible for employment.76 Instead, it
renders a class of otherwise qualified persons who are not
employees “unemployable.”77 The court thus concluded that the
NFL’s reliance on three Second Circuit cases, Wood v. National
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 382.
Id. (quoting Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir.1949)).
Id. at 391 (citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)).
Id. at 392 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 393.
Id.
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Basketball Ass’n,78 National Basketball Ass’n v. Williams,79 and
Caldwell v. American Basketball Ass’n,80 was misplaced.81 It
observed that, in sharp contrast to this case, the practices
challenged in each of those cases involved the wages, hours, or
working conditions of employees.82 The plaintiffs in Wood and
Williams were NBA employees who were represented by the
players’ association, but nevertheless challenged a salary cap
agreement the league had negotiated with their union.83 The
plaintiff in Caldwell was a former player challenging his
discharge.84
The district court distinguished these three cases, stating:
In sum, none of the cases cited by the NFL involve job
eligibility. The league provisions addressed in Wood,
Williams, and Caldwell govern the terms by which those
who are drafted are employed. The [draft eligibility rule],
on the other hand, precludes players from entering the
labor market altogether, and thus affects wages only in
the sense that a player subject to the Rule will earn none.
But the Rule itself . . . does not concern wages, hours, or
conditions of employment and is therefore not covered by
the non-statutory labor exemption.85
Having concluded that the rule was not a mandatory subject
of bargaining, the district court could have ended its analysis.
Nevertheless, the district court examined the two other Mackey
factors and found them similarly unavailing.86 First, the court
found that the rule “only affects players, like Clarett, who are
complete strangers to the bargaining relationship.”87 In this
regard, the court stated that “[t]he labor laws cannot be used to
shield anticompetitive agreements between employers and unions
that affect only those outside of the bargaining unit.”88 While it is
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1994).
66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
Id.
Id. at 393–94.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396–97.
Id. at 395.
Id. (“The labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially
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true that collective bargaining agreements apply to current
employees as well as those entering the workforce, the district
court stated that Clarett’s situation was “very different” because
he was not an employee and, indeed, was not eligible for
employment.89 The court observed:
That the non-statutory exemption does not apply in such
a case is simply the flip side of the rule that the
exemption only applies to mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining, those governing wages, hours, and working
conditions. Employees who are hired after the collective
bargaining agreement is negotiated are nonetheless
bound by its terms because they step into the shoes of the
players who did engage in collective bargaining. But
those who are categorically denied eligibility for
employment, even temporarily, cannot be bound by the
terms of employment they cannot obtain.90
This reasoning is required by longstanding Supreme Court
precedent on what has evolved into the first prong of the Mackey
standard. The agreements at issue in United Mine Workers v.
Pennington,91 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,92 and
Connell Construction Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100,93 were all held not to be protected by the nonstatutory labor exemption because, although they directly
concerned wages, hours, or terms and conditions of employment of
employees, they sought “to prescribe labor standards outside the
bargaining unit.”94 Like the small mine operators in Pennington,
the non-New York City manufacturers in Allen Bradley, and the
non-union subcontractors in Connell, Clarett and other similarly
situated athletes, who were strangers to the collective bargaining
relationship, were the direct and only object of the restraint.95
be given pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade
primarily affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.”
(citing Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976))).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 395–96.
91. 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965).
92. 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945).
93. 421 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1975).
94. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 668.
95. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 395; Connell Const., 421 U.S. at 619;
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Finally, the district court found that the non-statutory labor
exemption was inapplicable because “the NFL ha[d] failed to
demonstrate that the Rule evolved from arm’s-length negotiations
between the NFL and the NFLPA.”96 The rule, the court
observed, was adopted more than thirty years before the NFLPA
was even formed and more than forty years before it became the
players’ exclusive bargaining agent.97 Indeed, the court found
that the collective bargaining agreement never mentioned the
rule.98 While the NFL attempted to rely on the NFLPA’s
statement that it “waive[s] . . . its rights to bargain over any
provision of the Constitution and Bylaws . . . [and] to resolve any
dispute . . . involving the interpretation or application of the
Constitution and Bylaws in accordance with the dispute resolution
procedures of the CBA,” the district court read this language only
to confirm that the NFLPA had merely waived its right to bargain
and, consequently, that the rule itself “was never the subject of
collective bargaining between the league and the union, and did
not arise from the collective bargaining process.”99 Because the
rule did not evolve from the collective bargaining process, the NFL
could not shelter its anticompetitive agreement from antitrust
review.100
In short, the district court concluded the rule was not within
the reach of the non-statutory labor exemption for three separate
reasons, each of which was independently sufficient to foreclose
the exemption’s applicability.101
The case should have ended there. The NFL Combine was
only three weeks away and the Draft was three months beyond
that. Judge Scheindlin called counsel back into her courtroom and
asked if there was anything else to be done at her level. She also
advised the NFL what it already knew: the league had a limited
period of time to file an appeal before the case became moot—
when Clarett entered the league. Leaving the courtroom, I
overheard the NFL’s counsel telling a reporter “this is only the
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659; Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 798.
96. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 396.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting NFL CBA arts. III, IV, IX)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id. at 397.
101. Id.
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first period. There are two periods to play.” While I thought it
was odd enough for opposing counsel to use a hockey analogy, it
seemed that he had miscalculated the game clock. Why would the
Second Circuit grant expedited review to keep one grown man
from playing professional football if a team in the league was
ready to employ him at a substantial salary?
At a hearing on at least seven other motions for expedited
review, all of which seemed far more pressing than the Clarett
case, the Second Circuit denied all but the NFL’s Motion, setting
what seemed like a frenetic briefing schedule. Within a week, I
fielded requests from virtually every professional sports league
and its union as well as the NCAA, all of whom wanted to file
amicus briefs on behalf of the NFL. The only friend of the court
Clarett enjoyed was Representative John L. Conyers, Jr., of the
Committee on the Judiciary United States House of
Representatives, the Congressional committee charged with
overseeing the antitrust laws of the United States.102
Representative Conyers wrote:
As the Ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary
Committee, amicus has an overriding interest in
preserving and protecting the antitrust laws. Amicus is
concerned that the non-statutory labor exemption not be
extended in a manner that would undermine the integrity
of the antitrust laws or intrude on Congress’ traditional
purview in enacting such laws. In addition, amicus
believes that Clarett, who has been foreclosed from being
able to seek employment in the NFL, is precisely the type
of party Congress envisioned being able to seek relief
under the antitrust laws.103
At the oral argument in Foley Square, in a courtroom that
prominently displayed a bust of Learned Hand, reporters filled the
seats. From the beginning it seemed clear that the court, with
Judge Sonia Sotomayor leading the charge, wanted to reverse.
While one normally waits weeks or longer for a decision, the clerk
called my cell phone within an hour of the argument stating we
had lost.
102. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124
(2d Cir. 2004) (No. 04-910), 2004 WL 3057836 (U.S.).
103. Id. at 27–28 (quoting Rep. John L. Conyers, Mich.).
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In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit expressly
rejected the Mackey standard.104 The Second Circuit rejected
each of the district court’s conclusions and found the rule immune
from antitrust challenges under the non-statutory labor
exemption because it was imposed “on a labor market organized
around a collective bargaining relationship.”105 Under the Second
Circuit’s curious standard, all anticompetitive agreements among
employers who collectively bargain on a multi-employer basis are
exempt from antitrust review if the restraint is upon a “labor”
market.
Indeed, under the Second Circuit’s holding, it is
immaterial whether the matter involves a mandatory subject of
bargaining, restrains only strangers to the collective bargaining
relationship, or has even been collectively bargained for at all.
Rather, the mere presence of a union shelters all “labor” market
restraints. This standard deviated far from the holdings of other
circuits as well as the holdings of the Supreme Court. It is simply
wrong.
In Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen
v. Jewel Tea Co., a companion case to Pennington, the Supreme
Court reached a different result.106 There, a multi-employer
group of grocery stores agreed with the union representing its
butchers to limit the operation of meat counters to certain
hours.107 Jewel Tea, one of the stores that was a signatory to the
agreement, challenged the hours restriction on antitrust
grounds.108 Justices White and Goldberg, writing collectively for
six Justices, concluded that, for the non-statutory labor exemption
to be available, the labor-management agreement at issue must be
both a mandatory subject of bargaining and the product of “bona
fide, arm’s-length bargaining.”109 These two criteria represent the
second and third elements of the Mackey standard. The Second
Circuit, however, read Jewel Tea to mean that only “product”
market restraints are outside the reach of the exemption, a
reading wholly without justification.110 Nowhere in Jewel Tea did

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 134.
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
Id. at 679–80.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 689–90.
See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 132–34.
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the Supreme Court state that only restraints on the “product”
market were outside the reach of the exemption or that restraints
on the labor market were automatically insulated.111 Indeed,
under the Second Circuit’s holding, the many cases in which
player restraints have been challenged in situations when the
players were contemporaneously represented by a union that
negotiated on their behalf with teams that bargained on a multiemployer basis must have been wrongly reasoned.112 After all,
under the Second Circuit’s paradigm, the antitrust laws have no
applicability whatsoever and are, in effect, extinguished under
such circumstances.
In Connell, a union demanded that a contractor do business
only with subcontractors employing union members, despite the
fact that the union did not represent the contractor’s employees,
and the agreement sought was not a collective bargaining
contract.113 The contractor, who acquiesced in the demand only
after the union picketed one of its sites, challenged the
arrangement on antitrust grounds.114 The Supreme Court again
denied antitrust immunity to this “kind of direct restraint on the
business market [that] has substantial anticompetitive effects,
both actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.”115
The Second Circuit again misapplied precedent, misreading
Connell to mean that only “product” market restraints fall outside
the non-statutory labor exemption.116 Connell stands for nothing

111. In Jewel Tea, Justice White stated that application of the
nonstatutory labor exemption required balancing “the interests of union
members served by the restraint against its relative impact on the product
market.” 381 U.S. at 690 n.5. This formula, however, was designed to weigh
the competing antitrust and labor law considerations at stake, not to
establish that all labor market restraints fall automatically within the
exemption, as the Second Circuit decided.
112. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 231 (1996);
McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197–98 (6th Cir. 1979); Mackey
v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976); cf. generally Boris v. U.S. Football
League, Civ. A. No. 83-4980 LEW, 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984);
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass’n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977); Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
113. 421 U.S. 616, 619–20 (1975).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 625.
116. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 2004).
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of the sort. Nowhere in Connell did the Supreme Court limit its
holding to “product” market restraints. In fact, Connell supports
the conclusion, also present in Allen Bradley and Pennington, that
it is the exclusion of strangers to the collective bargaining
relationship that rendered the agreement subject to antitrust
scrutiny.117 Clarett was no different than the subcontractors in
Connell. He was an “economic actor” barred from selling his
talent in the market for player services. Moreover, as in Connell,
the union did not represent him.118
Indeed, the Second Circuit’s effort to distinguish “product”
markets from “labor” markets was illusory and flew in the face of
Supreme Court precedent.
So-called “product” and “labor”
markets are so intertwined and interconnected that they cannot
be distinguished from one another. For example, in Connell, the
agreement in question not only restrained prospective
subcontractors who could have bid upon jobs but for the
restriction, but also excluded employees of those employers who
were likewise foreclosed from employment opportunities.119 In
addition, in Jewel Tea, the restraint involved the store’s
marketing hours.120
Nevertheless, Justice White found the
restriction “so intimately related to wages, hours and working
conditions that the unions’ successful attempt to obtain that
provision through bona fide, arm’s length bargaining” was “within
the protection of national labor policy and . . . therefore exempt
from the Sherman Act.”121
The Second Circuit flatly rejected the district court’s reliance
on the standard announced in Mackey, stating that it had “never
regarded the Eighth Circuit’s test in Mackey as defining the
appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption.”122 The court

117. Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 625; United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 810 (1945).
118. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126; see also Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 619.
119. 421 U.S. at 618–19.
120. 381 U.S. 676, 679–80 (1965).
121. Id. at 689–90. See also BERNARD D. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 496 (1970)
(“The impact of wage costs on supply and price results in an inextricable
connection between the two markets. As a result, the general objectives of
the Sherman Act . . . can be frustrated by monopoly power exerted solely in
the labor market.”)
122. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133.
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stated,
we disagree with the Eighth Circuit’s assumption in
Mackey that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Connell,
Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Allen Bradley dictate the
appropriate boundaries of the non-statutory exemption
for cases in which the only alleged anticompetitive effect
of the challenged restraint is on a labor market organized
around a collective bargaining relationship.123
Thus, the Second Circuit plainly acknowledged that its
decision created a split among the circuits on the critically
important parameters of the exemption. Its holding directly and
unabashedly contravened the decisions of the Eighth Circuit in
Mackey,124 the Sixth Circuit in McCourt,125 and the Ninth Circuit
in Continental Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pacific Coast
Metal Trades District Council126 that the antitrust laws apply
fully to anticompetitive agreements affecting the labor market in
the context of a multi-employer collective bargaining situation.
While these courts, consistent with the district court’s sound
reasoning, would not allow the exemption automatically to shield
plainly anticompetitive conduct that restrains the rights of
prospective employees to practice their trade, the Second Circuit
would invoke the exemption in every case unless it was
“employers who asserted that they were being excluded from
competition in the product market.”127
The Second Circuit claimed to find further support for its
approach in the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on the reach of
the non-statutory labor exemption in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., a
case establishing the duration of the exemption.128 As if it meant
something, the Second Circuit announced that “eight Justices
[had] agreed that the non-statutory exemption precludes antitrust
claims against a professional sports league for unilaterally setting
policy with respect to mandatory bargaining subjects after
negotiations with the players union over those subjects reach
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 133–34
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
600 F.2d at 1193, 1215 (6th Cir. 1979).
817 F.2d 1391, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1987).
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134.
518 U.S. 231, 244 (1966).
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impasse.”129
But the Clarett case, of course, did not involve the duration of
the exemption. More importantly, the plaintiff in Brown was an
NFL employee and a member of the union.130 Clarett was
neither. He was instead a stranger to the bargaining relationship
because he was excluded from the league. Moreover, the subject
at issue in Brown was wages—an unquestionably mandatory
subject of bargaining—while the subject in Clarett—an
employment eligibility rule—was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining.131 The subject at issue in Brown was bargained over
extensively, indeed exhaustively, as demonstrated by the fact that
the parties reached impasse as to that issue, while in Clarett, no
bargaining at all took place over the rule.132
In Brown, the Supreme Court noted that the NFL conduct at
issue,
took place during and immediately after a collectivebargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was directly
related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process.
It involved a matter that the parties were required to
negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the parties
to the collective-bargaining relationship.133
Thus, the Brown decision is grounded on the very three factors
relied upon by the Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits but rejected
by the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit not only misused Brown to extend the
exemption far beyond what Brown or any other case would
sanction, it did so in defiance of the Supreme Court’s clear
instruction to the contrary.
Indeed, the Second Circuit
acknowledged that the Court in Brown had “expressed some
reservations about . . . the broader holding of the court of appeals
that the non-statutory exemption ‘waiv[es] antitrust liability for
restraints on competition imposed through the collectivebargaining process so long as such restraints operate primarily in

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Clarett, 369 F.3d at 137.
Brown, 518 U.S. at 233–34.
Id.; see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139; Brown, 518 U.S. at 233–34.
Brown, 518 U.S. at 250.

MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

A JUSTICE SYSTEM FAILURE

3/27/2015 10:24 AM

239

a labor market characterized by collective bargaining.’”134 But the
Supreme Court expressed far more than “reservations” about an
expansive interpretation of the non-statutory labor exemption. In
Brown, it wrote, “we do not interpret the exemption as broadly as
did the Appeals Court.”135
The Second Circuit rejected Clarett’s contention, and the
district court’s finding, that the rule is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining under the NLRA.136 The court wrote that “the
eligibility rules for the draft represent a quite literal condition for
initial employment and for that reason alone might constitute a
mandatory bargaining subject.”137 For this proposition, the
appellate court quoted Professor Gorman’s treatise Labor Law,
which states, “[i]n accordance with the literal language of the
Labor Act, the parties must bargain about the requirements or
‘conditions’ of initial employment.”138 This reference, however,
has nothing to do with employment eligibility, but only with the
initial terms and conditions of work for employees once they are
hired. “Conditions of employment” mean working conditions like
hours, facilities, or uniforms, not the conditions one must meet to
be hired. In addition, the Second Circuit stated, “eligibility rules
constitute a mandatory bargaining subject because they have
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current
NFL players” and “affect the job security of veteran players.”139
This conclusion, aside from being factually wrong,140 is contrary to
Supreme Court and National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
precedent on this issue.141
134. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (quoting Brown, 518 U.S. at 235).
135. 518 U.S. at 235.
136. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142.
137. Id. at 139.
138. Id. at 140 (quoting R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 504 (1976)).
139. Id.
140. Clarett’s eligibility for the draft would have had no effect at all on a
veteran player’s interest in job preservation because Clarett would simply
have taken the place of the last player chosen in the draft. The last player
drafted is traditionally known as “Mr. Irrelevant.” See McCann, supra note
4, at 912.
141. See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chem. Div., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); JohnsonBateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180 (1989); Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B. 543
(1989).
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The NLRA protects “employees” and, only under rare
circumstances that are not present here, non-employees.142 Thus,
the heart of that NLRA, section 7, states that “employees shall
have the right of self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.”143 This language is natural, of course,
because the purpose of the NLRA was to grant employees the
right to form unions and to bargain collectively, rather than
individually. Because the NLRA grants rights to employees, labor
and management must bargain only over the “wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment” of current employees,
not applicants for employment like Clarett or retirees.144
The Supreme Court and the NLRB have long held that
matters exclusively concerning job applicants or former employees
do not constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining.145 For
example, in Star Tribune and The Newspaper Guild of the Twin
Cities, the NLRB addressed the question of whether drug testing
for employment applicants was a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the NLRA.146 There, the NLRB unambiguously declared
that “[a]pplicants . . . are not ‘employees’ under the Act” and that,
therefore, the issue was not a mandatory subject of bargaining
under the NLRA.147 As a consequence, the employer could
unilaterally require job applicants to undergo drug screening and
was not obligated to bargain with the union representing its
current employees regarding that matter.148
The significance of Star Tribune is illuminated by its
companion case, Johnson-Bateman Co. and International Ass’n of
Machinists.149 There, the NLRB held that mandatory drug
testing for current employees was a mandatory subject of
bargaining, and thus, the employer’s unilateral adoption of such
142. See 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
145. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 404 U.S. 157; Johnson-Bateman,
295 N.L.R.B. 180; Star Tribune, 295 N.L.R.B 543.
146. 295 N.L.R.B. 543.
147. Id. at 557.
148. Id. See also NLRB v. USPS, 18 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that an employer generally has no duty to bargain over practices
that involve non-unit employees).
149. 295 N.L.R.B. 180.
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testing for current employees was a breach of its duty to bargain
with the union in good faith over the “wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment” of its employees under the
NLRA.150 These two cases, read collectively, clearly confirm that
mandatory subjects of bargaining involve the wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment of current employees, not
prospective employees.
Finally, in Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers, Local 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., the Supreme Court established the
parameters of the bargaining obligation under the NLRA.151
There, the question was whether the company was obligated to
bargain with its employees’ union over retirement benefits,
including health insurance, for retirees.152 The Supreme Court’s
decision provided:
Together, [Sections 1, 8(a)(5), 8(d) and 9(a)] establish the
obligation of the employer to bargain collectively, ‘with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment,’ with ‘the representatives of his
employees’ designated or selected by the majority ‘in a
unit appropriate for such purposes.’ This obligation
extends only to the ‘terms and conditions of employment’
of the employer’s ‘employees’ in the ‘unit appropriate for
such purposes’ that the union represents.153
In addition, the Supreme Court separately put to rest any
argument that employers were obligated to bargain with the
union representing their employees over persons who were not
employed. The Supreme Court held:
Section 9(a) of the [NLRA] accords representative status
only to the labor organization selected or designated by
the majority of employees in a ‘unit appropriate’ ‘for the
purposes of collective bargaining.’ . . . In this cause, in
addition to holding that pensioners are not ‘employees’
within the meaning of the collective-bargaining
obligations of the Act, we hold that they were not and

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 181, 188.
404 U. S. 157 (1971).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 164.
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could not be ‘employees’ included in the bargaining
unit.154
The Second Circuit’s decision contravenes Star Tribune,
Johnson-Bateman, and Pittsburgh Plate Glass. Those cases
illuminate the bright line drawn between those persons who are
employed and those who are either not yet employed or have
ceased employment. The former may exercise and enjoy the rights
and protections of the NLRA, while the latter may not.
Mandatory subjects of bargaining do not include matters
applicable only to non-employees, like Clarett, any more than they
did to the prospective employees in Star Tribune or the retirees in
Pittsburgh Plate Glass. Like all other employers in the United
States, the NFL has no duty to bargain with the NFLPA
regarding employment eligibility rules for prospective
employees.155 Such persons are not “employees” within the
meaning of the NLRA and are plainly not members of the
collective bargaining unit.156
Therefore, the employer’s
bargaining obligation does not extend to matters affecting only
them and questions concerning their eligibility for employment
are not, and cannot be, mandatory subjects of bargaining under
the NLRA.
To be sure, there are rare circumstances where rules affecting
non-employees may be deemed to “vitally affect” the terms and
conditions of employment of current employees and, therefore, fall
within the mandatory bargaining requirement.157 At the same
time, however, “[a]n indirect or incidental impact on unit
employees is not sufficient to establish a matter as a mandatory
subject. Rather, mandatory subjects include only those matters
that materially or significantly affect unit employees’ terms and
conditions of employment.”158
No such vital effects were
demonstrated in Clarett.
Of course eligibility rules, depending on their terms, may
lessen a veteran player’s risk of being replaced by an entering
player, but this is always true in any employment setting because
154. Id. at 171–72.
155. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004).
156. See 29 U.S.C § 152 (2012).
157. See, e.g., United Techs. Corp., 274 N.L.R.B. 1069, 1070 (1985),
enforced, 789 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1986).
158. Id.
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limiting access to employment will always result in greater job
security for incumbent employees. Such effect alone does not, and
cannot, convert employment eligibility rules into mandatory
subjects of bargaining, or the exception would wholly swallow the
rule and, contrary to Star Tribune, render eligibility rules
mandatory subjects of bargaining under all circumstances. Like
eligibility rules for prospective employees, retiree benefits may
also have a substantial impact on terms and conditions for current
employees, but that effect, of course, did not make such benefits a
mandatory subject of bargaining in Pittsburgh Plate Glass.159 By
expanding the duty to bargain to include employment eligibility
rules, the Second Circuit’s opinion fundamentally alters the
balance of power between employers and unions and broadens the
bargaining obligation beyond anything envisioned by Congress,
the Supreme Court, or the NLRB.
In any event, Clarett’s eligibility would have had no effect
whatsoever on the jobs of veteran players or their wages, let alone
a “vital effect.” The number of rounds in the NFL draft is limited
to seven. Roughly 214 new players were drafted in the 2004
draft.160 Clarett’s eligibility in that draft would have had no effect
at all on a veteran player’s interest in job preservation, because
Clarett would simply have taken the place of the last player
chosen in the draft. Put differently, regardless of whether Clarett
participated in the 2004 draft, the total number of new players
eligible was fixed. Thus, Clarett’s participation, or lack thereof,
would not affect the job security of players already in the league,
only the identity of the new players entering the league.
The Second Circuit asserted that Clarett “argues that the
eligibility rules are an impermissible bargaining subject because
they affect players outside of the union.”161 Not true. Clarett had
never taken this position. Quite to the contrary, Clarett argued
that eligibility rules are a permissive subject of bargaining.162
They are not “wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of
employment” for employees and, therefore, mandatory subjects of

159. 404 U.S. at 157.
160. See Draft Season 2004, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/draft/history/
fulldraft?season=2004 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
161. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2004).
162. Clarrett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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bargaining, but neither are they unlawful.163 The distinction was
critical. While it was true that the draft profoundly affects
players entering the unit by limiting the teams with which they
may negotiate, the draft eligibility rule foreclosed any employment
opportunity for a class of otherwise qualified applicants. Clarett
never challenged the validity of the draft mechanism as a lawful
and, indeed, mandatory subject of bargaining. He sought only to
be part of that mechanism.
The Second Circuit cited the hiring hall arrangement in
certain industries as authority for the proposition that
employment eligibility rules are mandatory subjects of
bargaining.164 This analogy highlights a fundamental flaw in the
court’s reasoning. Hiring halls exist “in certain industries—most
notably maritime, longshoring and construction” where the
“unions provide what is in effect a job-referral service and act as a
clearinghouse between employees seeking work and employers
seeking workers.”165
The NFLPA does not operate a hiring hall. It does not refer
players for employment to NFL teams needing a player with
particular skills for short-term employment. Put differently, the
particular needs of employers, employees, and unions, which make
hiring halls necessary in certain industries, have no bearing on
the NFL and, while such arrangements constitute mandatory
subjects of bargaining in those settings, nothing in the Clarett
case suggested that an employment eligibility rule that excludes
an otherwise qualified class of prospective employees is likewise
mandatory. Instead, in this setting, like the vast majority of
employment settings, the reach of the union’s bargaining
authority is coextensive with the collective bargaining unit and
did not include persons like Clarett who were neither employees,
members of the union, or part of the collective bargaining unit.
Indeed, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the Supreme Court
foreshadowed and rejected, this very argument advanced by the
NFL and accepted by the Second Circuit.166 Rejecting the hiring
hall analogy, the Supreme Court wrote,

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 140–41.
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 1125 (13th ed. 2001).
404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971).
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[t]he Board enumerated ‘unfair labor practice situations
where the statute has been applied to persons who have
not been initially hired by an employer or whose
employment has terminated. Illustrative are cases in
which the Board has held that applicants for employment
and registrants at hiring halls—who have never been
hired in the first place—as well as persons who have quit
or whose employers have gone out of business are
‘employees’ embraced by the policies of the Act.’ . . . Yet
all of these cases involved people who, unlike the
pensioners here, were members of the active work force
available for hire and at least in that sense could be
identified as ‘employees.’ No decision under the Act is
cited, and none to our knowledge exists, in which an
individual who has ceased work without expectation of
further employment has been held to be an ‘employee.’167
So, too, a person not eligible for employment, like Clarett, was not
an employee within the meaning of the NLRA.
The Second Circuit also noted that the NFL teams bargain
with the NFLPA on a multi-employer basis, an entirely
permissible arrangement under the NLRA, as support for its
conclusion that Clarett’s position would undermine federal labor
policy.168 This fact, however, has no bearing upon the question
whether an agreement among such employers and the union
representing their employees is immune from antitrust scrutiny
under the non-statutory labor exemption. After all, Allen Bradley
and Pennington both involved circumstances in which a group of
employers, bargaining on a multi-employer basis, had reached
anticompetitive arrangements with the unions representing their
employees, and, nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached the
question of antitrust liability and found such liability.169 Clarett
did not challenge the multi-employer bargaining arrangement in
professional football. The decision of the NFL and the NFLPA to
bargain on that basis, however, should not have served to insulate

167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143.
169. Allen Bradly Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798 (1945); United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1935).
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their anticompetitive conduct unless the other factors warranting
such immunity were present. Not one of the factors supporting
immunity were present.
Despite the fact that the rule appeared nowhere in the CBA,
the Second Circuit concluded that the draft eligibility rule was
“well known to the union, and a copy of the Constitution and
Bylaws was presented to the union during negotiations.”170 Thus,
the court reasoned, “the union or the NFL could have forced the
other to the bargaining table if either felt that a change was
warranted.”171 First, this conclusion flowed only from the Second
Circuit’s erroneous holding that employment eligibility rules were
mandatory subjects of bargaining and that management was
obligated to bargain with the union representing its employees
regarding the qualifications of the persons it seeks to employ.172
They are not mandatory subjects of bargaining, and management
is not so obligated. Moreover, even if such eligibility rules were
mandatory subjects of bargaining, the court’s holding that the
conduct of the NFL and the NFLPA amounted to the level of
arm’s-length collective bargaining necessary to shelter an
anticompetitive agreement conflicted with the decisions of every
Circuit that had considered the issue.173
The correct standard is clear: there must be substantial
evidence that “the parties bargained extensively over the [Rule]
and that the [NFLPA] representatives concluded that it was in the
best interest of the membership to agree to the [Rule] based on the
concessions received from the NFL.”174 In McCourt, as in
Zimmerman v. National Football League,175 the courts applied the
exemption because actual bargaining had taken place over the
restraint at issue.176 In Robertson v. National Basketball League,
as in Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
170. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 142.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir.
1979); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976); Zimmerman v.
NFL, 632 F. Supp. 398, 406 (D.D.C. 1986); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp.
867, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 499 (E.D. Penn. 1972).
174. See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203; Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 406.
175. 632 F. Supp. at 406.
176. 600 F.2d at 1203.
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Club, Inc.,177 the courts withheld the exemption based upon the
absence of “[s]erious, intensive, arms-length collective
bargaining.”178 In Zimmerman, the court focused on the details of
the exchanges between the parties, and, in McCourt, the court
concluded that the union had “bargained . . . vigorously,” against
the restraint at issue.179
In Mackey, on the other hand, no such bargaining took
place.180 The restraint under scrutiny, the so-called “Rozelle
Rule,” had been incorporated by reference into the collective
bargaining contract between the NFL and the NFLPA, and the
NFL argued that this incorporation immunized the restraint from
antitrust scrutiny.181 The Eighth Circuit disagreed, however,
finding that the rule was not the product of “bona fide arm’s
length bargaining.”182 The court reviewed the bargaining history
and affirmed the district court’s finding that the union had
received no quid pro quo for the rule’s inclusion in the collective
bargaining contract.183
At bottom, the naked restraint in Clarett fell squarely within
the view of bargaining set forth in Mackey and its progeny.
Indeed, there was no bargaining whatsoever over the rule, while
in those cases the bargaining was merely inadequate.184 For this
reason, the district court properly observed that the record “is
peculiarly sparse in establishing the evolution of the rule. Indeed,
what the record omits speaks louder than what it contains.”185
The court thus determined that the rule was not the product of
arm’s-length collective bargaining.186 On the same record, the
Second Circuit held this evidence sufficient under Jewel Tea to
177. 351 F. Supp. at 499.
178. 389 F. Supp. at 895 (quoting Phila. World Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp.
at 499).
179. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1203–04; Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 401–03.
180. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 616.
183. Id. at 623. The court further held that “[t]he union’s acceptance of
the status quo by the continuance of the Rozelle Rule in the initial collective
bargaining agreements . . . [could not] serve to immunize the Rozelle Rule
from the scrutiny of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 616.
184. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the
history of the rule created by the Commissioner pursuant to his authority).
185. Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
186. Id.

MILSTEINFINALEDITWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/27/2015 10:24 AM

248 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:216
invoke the exemption, virtually eliminating any requirement that
the challenged agreement be the product of bona fide arm’s-length
bargaining.187 By eliminating actual bargaining as a requirement
for invocation of the exemption, the Second Circuit again parted
ways and created a split in the circuits as to the role of actual
bargaining in the invocation of the exemption.
The Second Circuit’s decision as to the reach of the nonstatutory labor exemption was breathtaking. It permitted any
and all anticompetitive agreements among employers restraining
trade in the market for labor, so long as their employees are
represented by a union with which they collectively bargain on a
multi-employer basis.188 Indeed, under the Second Circuit’s
analysis, it would be immaterial whether or not the agreement
involved a mandatory subject of bargaining, primarily affected
only strangers to the collective bargaining arrangement, or was
unilaterally imposed by the employers and not the product of
arm’s-length collective bargaining. The mere presence of a union,
coupled with a multi-employer bargaining arrangement, would
shelter any anticompetitive arrangements regarding labor.
Nothing in any area of U.S. law suggests that policies underlying
labor law warrant such a sweeping repeal of the antitrust laws.
As the above analysis of the Second Court’s decision suggests,
age eligibility rules in professional sports can still be challenged
after Clarett, particularly the absurd “one and done” rule in
basketball. Such a challenge, however, is best to be filed in a
circuit where Mackey, a case brought by that great tight end from
my beloved Baltimore Colts, still roams the field.189
For Clarett, the Second Circuit decision meant that he would
sit out a second season without playing football, a lifetime for an
athlete. He spent that year lamenting his fate and drinking
heavily. When he showed up for the NFL Combine in February
2005, he was noticeably out of shape and out of sorts. In April, the
Denver Broncos reluctantly selected him in the third round of the
NFL Draft.190 His preseason camp was a disaster, and he was cut
187. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133–34.
188. Id.
189. For an excellent analysis of a prospective NBA player challenging
the NBA’s eligibility rule in a post-Clarett world, see McCann, supra note 4,
at 914–19.
190. Draft Season 2004, supra note 160.
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from the roster without ever playing a down in the NFL.191
After that, Clarett continued to descend. By the fall of 2006,
after two run-ins with the law, he hit rock bottom. Sentenced to
seven-and-a-half years in an Ohio state prison, Clarett ended up
in the place he had sworn he would avoid.192 It was a place from
which football should have provided an escape and would have if
the NCAA had not provided Geiger with the opportunity to ban
Clarett from college football.
Fortunately, Clarett was granted early release from prison
after three-and-a-half years.193 He is trying to get his life back
together and to make sense of his past. In a recent documentary
on Clarett, Judge Scheindlin commented on the life that could
have been but was wasted.194 “The justice system failed Maurice
Clarett,” she said, a remarkable admission by a sitting district
judge about an appellate court which reversed her.195

191. See Joe Drape, Gamble on Clarett Reveals Perils of Potential, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 31, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/sports/football/
31clarett.html?_r=0.
192. See Bruce Cadwallader, Clarett seeks early release from prision,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Feb. 10, 2010, 5:19 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/
content/stories/sports/2010/02/10/clarett.ART_ART_02-1010_C6_N5GI4JI.html.
193. See Shalise Manza Young, Timely warning for NFL rookies, BOS.
GLOBE (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P234833056.html.
194. Transcript: Youngstown Boys (ESPN television broadcast Dec. 15,
2013) (on file with author).
195. Id.

